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EQUALITY, ENTITLEMENT, AND NATIONAL
HEALTH CARE REFORM: THE CHALLENGE OF
MANAGED COMPETITION AND MANAGED CARE
Rand E. Rosenblatt*
INTRODUCTION

This Symposium is about "ensuring equal and quality
health care for poor Americans," an issue of special importance
as we struggle to achieve national health care reform. The
topic was fittingly chosen to honor the work and vision of Professor Edward V. Sparer, an extraordinary lawyer, scholar, and
activist in movements for equality and social justice.'
This topic is also an appropriate focus for consideration of
the Clinton Administration's proposed Health Security Act
("HSA" or "the Act").2 The first section of the HSA proclaims
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University Law School-Camden. This Article
expands on remarks made at the Symposium on Ensuring (E)qual(ity) Health Care
for Poor Americans at Brooklyn Law School, December 3, 1993. I would like to
thank Ann Freedman for her thoughtful comments, and Sylvia Law and other
members of the Society for American Law Teachers (SALT) Committee on Access
to Justice in Health Care Reform, for helping me think about justice issues in the
Health Security Act.
I A 1959 graduate of Brooklyn Law School, Ed Sparer founded three major
legal advocacy programs concerned with poverty law, welfare law, and health law,
was Professor of Law and Social Welfare at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School, and died in 1983 at the age of 55. Memorial essays and a bibliography of
his work can be found in 132 U. PA. L. REv. 421 (1984); see especially Sylvia A.
Law, Dedication: Edward V. Sparer, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 425 (1984). Sparer's own
perspective and his most comprehensive and last published statement can be found
in Edward V. Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the
Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36
STAN. L. REv. 509 (1984).
2 President Clinton's Health Care Reform Proposal. Health Security Act, H.R.
3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter HSAI. At the time this Article was
being written, in April 1994, it was not clear whether the HSA would be the base
from which Congress designed national health care reform legislation. As of April
18, 1994, the only congressional vote on health care reform had occurred in the
Health Subcommittee on the House Committee on Ways and Means, which had
narrowly endorsed "amendments" to the Administration's bill that made significant
changes in it-notably leaving to state discretion whether to establish purchasing
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that "each eligible individual"--meaning all citizens of the
United States and non-citizen legal residents--"is entitled to
the comprehensive benefit package [specified in the Act]
through the applicable health plan in which the individual is
enrolled."3 The HSA's stated purposes are, among others, "to
guarantee comprehensive and secure health coverage," "to
control the cost of health care," and "to ensure high quality
care."4 But the Act's commitment to comprehensive and secure
coverage, and to quality of care, is deeply ambiguous: the "entitlement"--the effort to "guarantee" and "ensure"--is to be
realized "through" enrollment in primarily privately owned,
for-profit health plans whose structure, incentives, and inner
dynamics will significantly define, and perhaps undercut, the
entitlement itself.'

alliances, and relying on an expansion of Medicare as the backup system to employment-based insurance. Many other subcommittee and committee votes in both
the House and the Senate remained to be held. Meanwhile, Senator George Mitchell, the Senate Majority Leader, circulated several variations on the Clinton bill to
Democratic senators. Adam Clymer, Senator Outlines Cheaper Versions of Health
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1994, at Al. The meanings of equality, quality, and
entitlement discussed in this Article will be relevant to whatever legislation finally
emerges from Congress.
' HSA § 1001(a) (emphasis added). Eligible individuals include all citizens and
legally resident aliens. Id. The exclusion of millions of other non-citizens remains a
major gap in the Act's promise of universal coverage. The entitlement to health
benefits does require individuals and families to pay partial premiums and
copayment amounts. See id. §§ 1002, 1131-1136, 1343-1345, 6101-6105. Health Alliances are responsible for notifying families of their share and of collecting any
amounts due that have not been paid through wage withholding or otherwise. Id.
§ 1344(a). Failure to pay premiums is supposed to lead to collection actions, but
will not result in loss of health care coverage. See id. § 1344(d).
' HSA § 3(1), (3), (5).
' Enrollment in privately owned, for-profit health plans is not formally required by nor inevitable under the HSA, but it is highly likely. The HSA does
permit states to establish state-wide or regional single-payer systems, HSA §§
1221-1224, which would eliminate the need for for-profit plans. But given the
political influence of the health insurance industry, it seems unlikely that more
than a few states, if any, will choose the single-payer option. Those that do are
likely to be small states. But see Seth Mydans, Petitions Seek California Vote on
Canada-Style Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1994, at A15 (reporting submission of more than one million signatures, well over the 677,000 needed to put the
issue on the November 8, 1994, ballot). In addition, a small number of consumers
will be able to enroll in existing nonprofit, consumer-owned health plans, such as
Group Health of Puget Sound, or in nonprofit programs based in low-income
neighborhoods, such as the Bronx Health Plan. Given high start-up and administrative costs, and the lack of significant public-policy support for nonprofit, consumer-oriented plans, the choices likely to be offered to the overwhelming majority
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This Article is about how we can struggle for the values of
equality and quality of care, and of entitlement, in the face of
this ambiguity and the political and social forces it reflects.
The Article begins in Part I by proposing a practical version of
what "equality," "quality" and "entitlement" might mean for
poor Americans and, indeed, for all Americans, in the context
of the Act's strategies of managed competition and managed
care. Part II then explores lessons from Ed Sparer's work
about what entitlement means in the context of pervasive
inequality, with particular reference to health care. The main
theme of this section is that the process of making
entitlements real, particularly for poor Americans and for
poorly organized groups such as health care consumers, is an
intensely political, social, and cultural process, as well as a
legal one, and depends centrally on building connections and
coalitions between lower-income Americans and the great majority of Americans whose incomes occupy the middle range.6
Finally, Part III develops these points in a particular context
by discussing the administrative claims provisions of the
Health Security Act, in light of the government's traditional
nonenforcement of consumer rights and the emerging dynamics
of managed care.
I.

EQUALITY, QUALITY, AND ENTITLEMENT IN HEALTH CARE:
A (SEEMINGLY) SIMPLE PROPOSAL

Until recently, the terms "equality" and "quality" in health
care had relatively clear meanings. "Quality" of care meant
of Americans will be privately owned, for-profit plans.
6 On the relationship of entitlements to larger social dynamics, see infra notes
12, 16, 17, 23, 25 and 26 and accompanying text; Joel F. Handler, 'Constructing
the Political Spectacle"." The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 947-74 (1990); and Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectics of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 611-52 (1986). Regarding "middle
range income," the median annual family income in 1992 was $35,776. Bureau of
the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1993 427 (Table 672) (median weekly earnings of $688 x 52 = $35,776)
[hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. The "middle range" of income is often conceived as stretching from one-half of the median ($17,888) to double the median
($71,552). The urban federal poverty line in 1994 was $14,350 for a family of four.
On the background of the federal poverty line, see Deborah A. Stone, Making the
Poor Count, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1994, at 84.
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what well-trained and well-regarded physicians customarily
did in treating patients. 'Equality" meant that everyone should
be able to have a good insurance policy that would cover most
of the costs of such care.7 While poor, lower-income, and minority Americans often were excluded from these ideals, the
ideals themselves were clear enough, and the Medicare and
Medicaid statutes of 1965 attempted to realize them for aged
and low-income Americans.
By 1994, however, the meaning of these terms has become
much less clear. The traditional idea of quality has been profoundly challenged: the customary practice of well-regarded
physicians is now seen by many analysts as flawed and corrupt, a "vast misallocation of resources"8 born of guild monopoly, deeply inefficient financing, excess technological capacity,
overspecialization, irresponsible tax subsidies, defensive medicine, and gross profiteering.9 Not surprisingly, "equal" access
to this morass is no longer viewed by many as a coherent and
defensible ideal. Both "quality" and "equality" now frequently
appear in policy discussions as concepts that must be redefined
in a new context of economic competition, financial constraint,
"managed" care, and explicitly stratified (i.e., unequal) benefit
plans and practice standards."

7 See, e.g., Daniel Fox, From Reform to Relativism: A History of Economists
and Health Care, 57 MILBANK Q. 297, 307-14 (1979).
8 PAUL STARR, THE LOGIC OF HEALTH-CARE REFORM 31 (1992).
For articulation of these themes by advocates of managed competition, see
STARR, supra note 8, at 25-32, and Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles
of Managed Competition, 12 HEALTH AFF. 24, 25-27 (Supp. 1993). For articulation
of similar themes by analysts who are neutral about or critical of managed competition, see Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reorganizing the Financial Flows in American
Health Care, 12 HEALTH AFF. 172, 178-83, 187-89 (Supp. 1993), and Deborah A.
Stone, When Patients Go To Market: The Workings of Managed Competition, AM.
PROSPECT, Spring 1993, at 109, 111-12. From a very different perspective than
that of managed competition, advocates of a greatly increased public health sector
make a related point that improving access to doctors is not an efficient nor effective method of improving health, which, they argue, depends on access to and use
of vaccinations, periodic tests, and examinations for cancer, and effective treatment
for those with high blood pressure and cholesterol. See Michael Alderman & Douglas Shenson, A Ton of Cure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1994, § 4, at 17.
10 In addition to the sources cited supra note 9, see Richard A. Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical Malpractice: The Virginia Obstetrical
No-Fault Statute, 74 VA. L. REV. 1451, 1459-63 (1988) (arguing that federal and
state Medicaid officials should be authorized to bargain for a lower standard of
care for the poor); E. Haavi Morreim, Commentary, Stratified Scarcity and Unfair
Liability, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1033 (1986); and John Siliciano, Wealth, Equi-
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Powerful criticism about managed competititon and managed care continues and, at times, was expressed by this
Symposium's participants." While equally critical of the traditional system's many failings, 2 egalitarian analysts doubt

ty, and the Unitary Malpractice Standard, 77 VA. L. REV. 439, 465-66, 475-81
(1991) (arguing that [ijn a very real sense . .. the [American] poor constitute a
separate nation, and their health care needs should be assessed accordingly"). For
a critique of these positions, see Rand E. Rosenblatt, Quality of Care and the Law,
in GEORGE J. ANNAS, SYLVIA A. LAW, RAND E. ROSENBLATT, & KENNETH R. WING,
AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 377, 419-21 (1990 & Supp. 1993). For other discussions of
the impact of managed care on quality standards, see INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE: FROM DEVELOPMENT TO USE (Marilyn J. Field
& Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1992) [hereinafter IOMIGUIDELINESI; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE? THE ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT (Bradford H. Gray & Marilyn J. Field eds., 1989) [hereinafter
IOMUTILIZATION]; Jonathan J. Frankel, Note, Medical MalpracticeLaw and Health
Care Cost Containment: Lessons for Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103
YALE L.J. 1297 (1994).
n "Managed competition" is defined by Alain Enthoven as
a purchasing strategy to obtain maximum value for money [in health
care] ....
It uses rules for competition, derived from rational microeconomic principles, to reward with more subscribers and revenue those
health plans that do the best job of improving quality, cutting cost, and
satisfying patients. The "best job" is in the judgment of both the sponsor
[e.g., a health alliance, health insurance purchasing cooperative, or large
employer] armed with data and expert advice, and informed, cost-conscious consumers. The rules of competition must be designed and administered so as not to reward health plans for selecting good risks, segmenting markets, or otherwise defeating the goals of managed competition.
Enthoven, supra note 9, at 29. Enthoven earlier characterized these rules as promoting "socially desirable competition." ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN 126
(1980); see also STARR, supra note 8, at 47-50. "Managed care" has no single, wellaccepted definition, but embraces "in the emerging conventional usage ...
any
health plan that limits the choice of providers or regulates their treatment decisions to eliminate inappropriate care and reduce costs." Id. at 40; see also Elizabeth W. Hoy et al., Change and Growth in Managed Care, 10 HEALTH AFF. 18, 19
(1991). Managed competition at the level of competing health plans will almost
certainly lead to managed care at the practitioner level. However, managed care
could also be implemented without managed competition, for example by a singlepayer system. For critical perspectives on managed competition in this Symposium,
see Theodore R. Marmor, The National Agenda for Health Care Reform: What Does
it Mean for Poor Americans?, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 83, 89-90 (1994); Ann C.
McGinley, Aspirations and Reality in the Law and Politics of Health Care Reform:
Examining a Symposium on (E)qual(ity) Care for the Poor, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1,
22-26 (1994) (describing remarks of David U. Himmelstein).
12 Ed Sparer himself, and those of us who learned from him, did not and do
not defend the waste, unaccountability, profiteering, and inequality that have characterized much of American health care from the 1960s to the present. On the
contrary, beginning in the early 1970s, when the market competition approach to

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:105

that a managed competition strategy can achieve its goals or
contain costs in a responsible way. Many factors support this
view: a competitive system will involve high costs of administration and profit, risk-selection will remain the most lucrative
strategy, and egalitarian values will be in permanent tension
with profit-making. In addition, integrated health care delivery
systems will be too complex to permit coherent comparison
shopping, and there is little knowledge or consensus about
what separates "core benefits" from "incidentals," or justified
conservative medicine from risky underservice."3 Analysts
have also challenged the core premise of market competition,
which denies society's capacity to think about these issues as a
social or political matter, and instead asserts, through "authoritative stories," that these decisions must be made by an abstract "economic man." 4
Related to these important debates over managed competition is the critical question of who will participate in the debates and on what terms. Especially in a period of transition
regarding the values and structure of health care delivery,
equality and quality of care have important "process meanings"
that overlap with the meaning of "entitlement." First, equality
means, at the very least, that health care consumers receive
whatever the rules in force at the time say they are entitled to
receive. This idea surely is at the core of President Clinton's
15
famous phrase, health care "that can never be taken away,"

health care was only beginning to emerge, Sparer and his colleagues, notably Sylvia Law, identified and criticized many of these problems. See, e.g., SYLVIA A.
LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? (1974); Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care,
Markets, and Democratic Values, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1067, 1068-69 nn.2-3 (1981);
Edward V. Sparer, Gordian Knots: The Situation of Health Care Advocacy for the
Poor Today, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1, 10-21 (1981).
" See David U. Himmelstein et al., Mangled Competition, AM. PROSPECT,
Spring 1993, at 116 (1993); Rosenblatt, supra note 12, at 1088-1115; Stone, supra
note 9, at 112-15.
"' See David M. Frankford, Neoclassical Health Economics and the Debate Over
National Health Insurance: The Power of Abstraction, 18 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 351,
353 (1993); David M. Frankford, Privatizing Health Care: Economic Magic to Cure
Legal Medicine, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1992); Rosenblatt, supra note 12, at 106870, 1088-1115.
" Clinton's Health Plan: Transcript of President's Address to Congress on
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at A24. President Clinton stated: "At
long last, after decades of false starts, we must make this our most urgent priority: giving every American health security, health care that can never be taken
away, health care that is always there. That is what we must do tonight." Id.
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and it is also a core meaning of "entitlement." In addition, to
the extent that the "rules" of health care-statutes, judicial
doctrine, contracts, professional standards, practice guidelines,
etc.-address issues of quality, they also define that term.
Second, to the extent that these rules confer discretion on
many types of people-doctors, utilization managers, health
plan and hospital executives, and government officials-both
equality and quality mean that the needs and interests of all
identifiable groups of consumers should be fairly taken into
account. Although "fairly" may arguably be defined in different
ways, at the very least it means that significant needs and
interests will be given respectful and serious consideration.
Third, to the extent that the rules and discretionary standards
are in flux-as indeed they are-equality requires that all
significantgroups or clusters of needs and interests have meaningful access to the process of discussion and decision regarding
health care policy. Again, there may well be debate about what
"meaningful access" entails, and who and what are "significant" groups or clusters of interests, but surely a great many
groups and interests-such as pregnant women, children, the
disabled, HIV-positive people, underserved minorities-can
easily be agreed upon.
These process meanings of equality and quality, then,
overlap with a process approach to entitlement in complex
regulatory and redistributive social legislation such as health
care. Under this approach, entitlement and "rights" include not
only rights to definite benefits or outcomes, but also rights to a
process of decision or allocation that gives appropriate weight
to the often vulnerable values and interests that the legisla16
ture wished to protect.

16 See,

e.g., Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts, Health Care Reform, and the Re-

construction of American Social Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 439,
440 n.2, 443, 444-49 (1993) (discussing the federal courts' "rights-enforcing" or
"norm-realizing" role) [hereinafter Rosenblatt, Social Legislation]; Rand E. Rosenblatt, Social Duties and the Problem of Rights in the American Welfare State, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW 90, 104-08 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) (discussing a
model in which courts, in dialogue with legislatures, create social duties that may
or may not generate individual rights) [hereinafter Rosenblatt, American Welfare];
Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural
Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 253-64 (1978) (discussing a "structural due process"
approach to statutory interpretation) [hereinafter Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform].
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IH. EQUALITY, ENTITLEMENT, AND THE LEGACY OF ED SPARER
These three meanings of equality and entitlement, and
particularly the first, may seem obvious and primitive. "Of
course" people should receive the benefits to which they are
entitled under the rules. Yet when Ed Sparer and his colleagues began fashioning modern poverty law at Mobilization
for Youth ("MF'Y") in New York City in the early 1960s, they
discovered that, for poor people, this obvious principle of entitlement was revolutionary. Sparer provided an example of this
point in a speech in 1965:
A tired, haggard lady in her early forties came to our [MFY] office
last week with her four children, ages four years to fifteen years.
She was sent to us by a social worker in a local hospital to whom
she had gone for help. The woman and her children had spent the

preceding night sleeping on the floor of a church. The day before she
had spent in a local welfare office and was rejected for even emergency assistance. She had spent several previous nights sleeping,
with her children, on the floors of local tenement hallways. The
Social Welfare Law of New York is crystal clear, I might add, that
the lady in question and her children were entitled to, at the very
least, emergency welfare assistance for shelter and food. They received the assistance when a mandamus proceeding was threatened. 7

After describing this and two other cases, 8 Sparer argued
that these examples and many others illustrated "the frequently callous, the often just plain lawless manipulation of the poor
by private trader and allegedly benevolent government agent
alike."19 Overcoming these pervasive and long-standing practices would require a "contemporary American revolution.""
It is a revolution that is concerned not with charity, but with justice-individual justice, equal justice, and social justice. The gap
between the promise of justice and the practices that the impoverished, the uneducated and inarticulate have endured is what cannot
be tolerated any longer.... A first practical step.., is to close the
gap between the theoretical legal rights of all our citizens and the

'
Edward V. Sparer, The New Legal Aid as an Instrument of Social Change,
1965 U. ILL. L. FORUM 57, 57-58.
18 These involved a young man about to be fired because of a false creditor's
action and two brothers about to be evicted from public housing because of a rigid

rule about family composition. Id.
19Id. at 58.
20

Id. at 57.
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prevailing legal defenselessness of the poor. This means, of course,
creating a vast new array of legal services.... The new legal aid
lawyer's role should be defined by the broadest reaches of advocacy,
just as is the role of the corporation lawyer.... 2

Several themes are evident in Sparer's analysis. First,
poor people's inability to obtain what they are due under the
rules is not the result of isolated errors or deviant officials.
Instead, the interlocking systems of procedural and substantive law and practice function systematically to deny the poor
their often meager rights. Second, pro-active, expansively conceived legal services can help make those unenforced rights
real and can also achieve new rights. Third, an effort of this
sort clearly involves more than just legal advocacy and legal
reasoning. To be made real, rights both must support and be
supported by a culture and a constituency that has at least
some self-awareness and organized form.
In short, the realization of what seemed to be a simple,
obvious entitlement-applying the rules even when they benefited poor people-would require a kind of revolution, a significant redistribution of resources, power, and self-respect in
favor of a group that had been politically and legally silenced.2 2 Sparer's goal, as he defined it, was to empower the
poor themselves-to achieve "the engagement into the democratic process of the dark-skinned, whether rich or poor, and
the poor, whether dark-skinned or light ... so that [they]
may... make their own voices heard, and assert their human
and legal rights to the fullest."'
In many respects, Sparer and his comrades in the legal
services and welfare rights movements were remarkably successful. They persuaded state and federal courts, including the
United States Supreme Court, to define statutory and constitutional rights and entitlements in new ways that brought the
Id. at 59-60.
See, e.g., Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 259 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1966) (holding that cash welfare assistance is a gratuity, not a legal obligation of government
and, "being absolutely discretionary," there can be no judicial review of recipient
allegations that welfare department officials were using illegal methods of investigating eligibility), affd on other grounds, 380 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (court of
appeals assumed that these propositions were incorrect, but affirmed summary
judgment for defendants on the ground that the plaintiff welfare recipients had
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies).
Sparer, supra note 17, at 57.
21

22
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poor closer to first-class citizenship.24 They established a nation-wide program of legal services which has provided extremely important advocacy for the poor, both in individual
cases and at the level of judicial, executive, and legislative
policy. These advocates obtained increased material resources
for millions of people and, to varying degrees at different
times, helped mobilize the poor as an organized political presence in local, state, and national politics.
At the same time, these efforts had a paradoxical, selflimiting quality even when (as was certainly not always the
case) they seemed most "successful." Analysts on the left, center, and right, have pointed to these limits' and, indeed,
Sparer himself recognized what he termed "binds," "traps," and
"Gordian Knots."26 At the most general level, the problem was
that most non-poor Americans viewed successful advocacy for
rights of the poor not as bringing the poor into the family of
citizenship, but rather as creating "special" rights for "them"
which undermined the income and culture of the majority.
Sparer saw that no matter how formally the rights of the poor
were defined in law, they would never be secure or, for that
matter, adequate as long as they were perceived as different
than, and antagonistic to, the needs and rights of the majority
who identify themselves as hard-working taxpayof Americans
27
ers.

Professor Sparer explained how these dynamics worked in
the area of health care. First, because health care for the poor
is significantly financed by regressive federal, state, and local
payroll, property, and sales taxes (and surcharges on hospital
24 See, e.g., Rosenblatt, Social Legislation, supra note 16, at 439, 444-49;
Rosenblatt, American Welfare, supra note 16, at 90, 92-95; Edward V. Sparer, The
Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 65 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1970).
' For quite diverse expressions of these and other themes, see JERRY MASHAW,
DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 34-35 (1985); Richard A. Epstein, No
New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747 (1990); Handler, supra note 6, at 958-60;
William H. Simon, The Rule of Law and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 777, 782-88 (1990); William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983).
26 See Sparer, supra note 12; Edward V. Sparer, Welfare Reform: Which Way Is
Forward?, 35 NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N BRIEFCASE 110, 144 (1978)
[hereinafter Welfare Reform].
27 See Edward V. Sparer, Legal Services and Social Change: The Uneasy Question and the Missing Perspective, 34 NATL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N BRIEFCASE 58, 60-62 (1977).
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reimbursement), advocacy that succeeds in expanding access
for the poor imposes costs on those not much financially better
off, and leads almost inevitably to a political backlash and
program cutbacks." Second, merely getting poor patients access to health care delivery is an ambiguous triumph; while
some will be helped, others will be harmed by unnecessary or
poorly delivered care. Although these dangers face all patients,
they are particularly acute in the case of the poor, who traditionally have been the victims of professional power, silence,
and discrimination on grounds of race, gender, and class."
Third, Sparer identified an especially painful paradox:
expanding access to health care for the poor may actually increase economic, political, and social inequality. Briefly summarized, powerful political actors-hospitals, physicians, pharmaceutical companies and, since Sparer's time, myriad health
care entrepreneurs-reap the lion's share of greatly increased
governmental health care funding for the poor and the aged.
Thus in the "name" of the poor, money is significantly redistributed from middle- and lower-middle class payers of taxes
and premiums to upper-middle class and wealthy professionals, managers, and investors. Part of this wealth is then fed
back into the political system to pay for campaign contributions and lobbying, forming a potent barrier to egalitarian
change. Most ironically, the funds flowing to the well-off "on
behalf' of the poor are "charged" to what might be termed the
poor's "social account": assistance for food, housing, transportation, and education must be slashed to "pay for" the rising
health care "benefits." Indeed, poverty itself is said to be "eliminated" because ever-increasing billions for health care are
being "transferred to" the poor."0
To overcome these painful dilemmas, Sparer tried to identify advocacy issues and strategies that would unite low-income patients with most other patients and with potentially
sympathetic elements among providers and other groups. He
saw that issues of quality, patient and consumer empowerment, accessible and humane primary care, non-physician
See Sparer, supra note 12, at 2-9. For a recent analysis of how people with
modest incomes pay substantially higher tax rates than the wealthy, see DONALD
L. BARLETr & JAMES B. STEELE, AMERICA= WHO REALLY PAYS THE TAxES? (1994).
See Sparer, supra note 12, at 10-15.
See Sparer, supra note 12, at 16-21.
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providers, occupational health, and fair cost control spanned
almost all socioeconomic groups. These issues provided a potential basis for rights that would flow from and support a
broader social-political movement for equality in health care.3
As Professor Sparer's later writings suggested, litigation
on behalf of the poor, while often necessary and sometimes
helpful, may be a symptom of political and social failure. If
minorities and the poor were really accepted and supported in
the democratic process, if their needs and interests were a
legitimate part of our governmental and social culture, then
the gap between legislative promise and social reality would
not be so large, and the need for litigation would be substantially less. Sparer always asked whether advocacy, litigation
and rights contributed to a broader process of egalitarian social
change, or did they accomplish the opposite through the paradoxes discussed above? Of course, answering this question
always has been a very uncertain enterprise. Yet that is the
question that I think Professor Sparer would have seen as
being posed by the title of this Symposium. He was highly
aware of the importance of recognizing and protecting the
needs of the poor, both those that they share with others and
those that are special in kind or degree. Yet he also was aware
that to meet even the special needs, it is critical to find political and cultural connections and support in the broader population.3 2 The good and bad news, apparent during Sparer's life
and even more so in the years since his death in 1983, is that
increasingly large numbers of middle-class Americans are
being subjected to the kinds of insecurity and disregard in
health care once reserved primarily for minorities and the
poor. Indeed, because of this trend, national health care reform
is on the political agenda. Whether that insecurity can be fashioned into an egaliatarian cross-class coalition for genuine
health security is the great hope and the great unknown.

" See generally Sparer, supra note 12, especially at 22-23; Sparer, supra note
27, at 61-62.
2 On the Clinton Administration's efforts to wrestle with the politics of building broad public support for programs to help low-income citizens, see Jason
DeParle, Euphemisms Mask Fervor in Latest Attack on Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
17, 1994, § 4, at 5. The author does not explain why he believes describing the
Head Start program as an "investment in children" is a "euphemism." See id.
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THE CLINTON ADMINISTRA-

TION'S HEALTH SECURITY ACT

The Health Security Act would make very large contributions to equality and quality of care for all Americans, including poor Americans. Three features of the plan deserve special
mention. First, the Act clearly creates an entitlement to health
insurance for all American citizens regardless of income, employment status, or health condition.3 3 This would enormously
improve equality and quality for the estimated fifteen percent
of Americans who are currently uninsured. It particularly
benefits millions of lower-income workers whose employers do
not provide health insurance and whose income exceeds
Medicaid's low eligibility levels. Second, the Act specifies a
"comprehensive benefit package" which would create a floor of
equal coverage, while also allowing consumers to buy additional benefits." Third, Medicaid recipients-by definition lowincome consumers-would choose health plans and receive care
through the same regional alliances as most other consumers,
thereby helping to overcome the long tradition of segregated
and inferior care for the poor.35 More generally, the Act attempts in various ways, in the words of the White House Domestic Policy Council Report, to "provid[e] care based only on
HSA § 1001. See supra note 3.
3'See HSA §§ 1101-1128.

See HSA §§ 1001(d), 1002(b)(2), 4201. On the tradition of segregated and
inferior care for the poor, see Rand E. Rosenblatt, Dual Track Health Care-The
Decline of the Medicaid Cure, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 643, 643-46 (1975). The degree
to which the Act would integrate low-income consumers into a larger pool of consumers is made uncertain by its delegation to the states of substantial discretion
to designate the geographic boundaries of the regional alliances. States must designate a geographic area for each alliance. HSA § 1202(b)(1). The alliance must have
.a population large enough to ensure that the alliance has adequate market share
to negotiate effectively with health plans," id. § 1202(b)(2)(A), and the state may
not divide "a metropolitan statistical area." Id. § 1202(b)(5). Moreover, in drawing
alliance boundaries states "may not discriminate on the basis of or otherwise take
into account race, ethnicity, language, religion, national origin, socioeconomic status, disability, or perceived health status." Id. § 1202(b)(4). Despite this last prohibition, the HSA's failure to define clearly "a metropolitan statistical area" ("msa")
(as between a "primary" msa, which typically includes a city and only a few nearby suburban areas, and a "consolidated" msa, which typically includes a much
larger area) leaves open the distinct possibility that many suburban areas will be
separated from urban areas, thereby isolating disproportionately poor and minority
consumers from a larger consumer pool. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6,
at 916-17. I am indebted to Professor Rashi Fein for pointing out this ambiguity.
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differences of need, not individual or group characteristics,"
and assure that "fair and open democratic procedures... underlie decisions concerning the operation of the health care
system and the resolution of disputes that arise within it."36
Implementation of these two principles would greatly facilitate
realizing the meanings of equality and quality of care, and of
entitlement, proposed above. At the same time, the Act has
serious shortcomings, and changes are needed to support the
fulfillment of those principles.
A.

The Tradition of Resistance to and Nonenforcement of
EgalitarianStatutory Provisions

The admirable principles of equality and quality health
care will encounter resistance. Economic, budgetary, and interest-group pressures create strong incentives to avoid serving
the higher-cost and/or currently uninsured patients whom the
Act is designed to protect. Bureaucracies created by insurance
companies, providers, and government agencies historically
have operated with little consumer input and have systematically failed to enforce provisions meant to protect vulnerable
groups." A long tradition of inadequately funded, inferior,
and segregated health services for low-income and minority patients remains entrenched by widespread racial, gender, ethnic, and class bias in many parts of the system.3"
31WHIE HOUSE DOMESTIC POL'Y COUNCIL, THE PRESIDENT'S HEALTH SECURITY
PLAN 11, 13 (1993).
"TSee, e.g., LAW, supra note 12 (discussing the role of Blue Cross as Medicare
intermediary); Elizabeth Jameson & Elizabeth Wehr, Drafting National Health
Care Reform Legislation to Protect the Health Interests of Children, 5 STAN. L. &
POL'y REV. 152, 166-68 (1993) (discussing coverage provisions of the federal HMO
Act); Rosenblatt, Social Legislation, supra note 16 (discussing the Boren Amendment and other legislation); Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform, supra note 16 (discussing the Hill-Burton Act, Medicaid and national health planning); Sidney D.
Watson, Health Care in the Inner City: Asking the Right Question, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1648, 1666-71 (1993) (discussing Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
"8See, e.g., AMA Council on Ethical & Jud. Aff., Black-White Disparities in
Health Care, 263 JAMA 2345 (1990); Kenneth C. Goldberg et al., Racial and Community Factors Influencing Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery Rates for All
1986 Medicare Patients, 267 JAMA 1473 (1992); Jane Perkins, Race Discrimination
in America's Health Care System, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 371 (1993); Vernellia R.
Randall, Racist Health Care: Reforming an Unjust Health Care System to Meet the
Needs of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 127 (1993); Mark Schlesinger, Paying the Price: Medical Care, Minorities, and the Newly Competitive Health Care
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Against this background, it is virtually certain that the
goals of equal access, quality assurance, and fair procedures
will come under serious attack. Whatever the shape of the
national health reform law enacted by Congress, many levels
of government and the health care industry will play a large
role in further defining the meaning of rights and remedies
through regulations and on-the-ground operations. Legal
rights, process, and advocacy will play an important role in the
struggle to define and implement health care as a right "that
can never be taken away."
At this critical moment in the design and implementation
of reform, the federal courts have largely abandoned their
important supporting role. From the early 1970s until the
early 1990s, the federal courts generally had permitted beneficiaries of federal statutes to enforce judicially statutory provisions against state and federal agencies and, at times, against
private entities, even in the absence of explicit statutory language granting beneficiaries specific "rights."3 9 For example,
Justice Brennan, writing for a five-justice majority in Wilder v.
Virginia Hospital Ass'n, explained that in lawsuits against
state agencies, the proper method of statutory interpretation
was not to search for magic words such as "right" or "cause of
action," but rather to inquire whether the statute created a
"binding obligation" on a government agency to act.4" If that
obligation was intended to benefit the party seeking to enforce
it, then that party-in this case, hospitals-had a federal right
under the statute and a federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, unless the opposing party-in this case, the state agency-could show, by clear evidence, that Congress did not intend
to create enforceable rights or had foreclosed enforcement
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4'
In 1992, however, after the retirement of Justices Brennan

System, 65 MILBANK Q. 270 (1987); David B. Smith, The Racial Integration of
Health Facilities, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 851 (1993); Watson, supra note
37.
.3See generally Rosenblatt, Social Legislation, supra note 16.
,0496 U.S. 498, 510-12 (1990).
' Id.; see also Rosenblatt, Social Legislation, supra note 16, at 459-60; Rand E.
Rosenblatt, Statutory Interpretation and Distributive Justice: Medicaid Hospital
Reimbursement and the Debate Over Public Choice, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 793, 801
(1991).
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and Marshall, and the appointment of Justices Souter and
Thomas, the Supreme Court revisited this issue. In Suter v.
Artist M., a new majority, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, held that a statutory funding requirement-that
child protection agencies make "reasonable efforts" to prevent
the removal of children from their homes-was not sufficiently
clear in its language to create an enforceable right under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 or that, if it did, the "right" required only that
the state file the appropriate forms with the federal government, which had been done." Although Wilder technically
was not overruled, the Supreme Court has adopted a new
approach to interpreting federal statutes that could undercut
the enforceability of many of the responsibilities created by the
Health Security Act and other federal legislation. Therefore, it
is critical that any legislation specify duties, rights, and remedies in very clear terms."
The Importance of Process in the Dynamics of Managed
Competition and Managed Care

B.

As noted at the beginning of this article, the HSA is constructed around a central ambivalence. On the one hand, the
Act promises all Americans entitlement to a comprehensive
benefit package. On the other hand, it delegates the power to
fashion most of the details of how the benefits will be delivered
to states, regional and corporate alliances, and health plans
competing to offer the lowest price and reap the highest profits. For example, all Americans will have "coverage" for hospitalization and referrals to specialist physicians, but the rules
and policies that will determine whether and how patients
receive those services will vary considerably among geographic
areas, health plans, and income groups."

42

112 S. Ct. 1360, 1370 (1992).

' Compare Evelyn V. v. Kings County Hosp. Ctr., 819 F. Supp. 183 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding, on the basis of Suter, that numerous federal statutory provisions
and regulations regulating quality of care in the Medicaid program did not create
enforceable federal rights on behalf of patients against a public hospital or local
government) with Wellington v. District of Columbia, No. 93-452, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4508, at *6-*9 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1994) (harmonizing Wilder and Suter and
finding several sections of the Medicaid Act judicially enforceable against the District of Columbia).
4 For an example of how this problem has already arisen in the Medi-
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Advocates of managed competition realize that unregulated market competition in health care would have a devastating
effect on patient well-being, because insurers and providers
would rush to enroll healthy people and avoid patients who
need services (a practice known as "preferred risk selection").
Thus, in the words of Alain Enthoven, managed competition is
"not no rules," but "new rules,"45 most of which are embodied
in the Act. Because the profit motive is so powerful, and preferred risk selection so profitable, the new rules have to be
very complicated and sophisticated. They begin by requiring all
plans to offer a standardized benefit package, to accept all
applicants during open-enrollment periods, to engage in nondiscriminatory marketing, and to provide consumers with information about quality of care.4"
But even with all these protections, it is likely, either by
accident or design, that some plans will enroll a significantly
different range of risks than others. Therefore, the new rules
also include "risk-adjusted premiums" to even out the financial
playing field.47 The goal is to direct the powerful engine of
profit-seeking toward eliminating wasteful, inefficient or marginally useful service, staffing, and reimbursement practices.
Yet, while there is a great deal of interesting research and
argument on these topics, there is relatively little clear knowledge or consensus about what these practices are.4" Indeed,

care/HMO context, see GERALDINE

DALLEK ET AL.,

MEDICARE RISK-CONTRACT

HMOs IN CALIFORNIA: A STUDY OF MARKETING, QUALITY, AND DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS 113-20 (1993) (reporting up to six-fold variations among three California
HMOs in the rates per 1,000 Medicare enrollees of coronary bypass and other
surgical procedures) [hereinafter MEDICARE RISK]; see also Geraldine Dallek, Quality Assurance in the Clinton Health Plan 4 (Feb. 3, 1994) (testimony before the
Subcomm. on Health & Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce) (on
file with author). To be sure, comparable variations in hospitalization and surgical
rates have existed for years in the traditional fee-for-service system. See, e.g., John
Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, 3
HEALTH AFF. 6 (1984). The differences between managed care and fee-for-service
are that under fee-for-service, patients are at least formally free to seek second
opinions or alternative sources of care, and providers' financial incentive is generally to provide rather than to withhold services.
'5 Enthoven, supra note 9, at 44.
'
See HSA §§ 1401-1414; Enthoven, supra note 9, at 29-35.
47 See HSA §§ 1351, 1541; Enthoven, supra note 9, at 33-34.
"' See, e.g., Robert H. Brook et al., Geographic Variations in the Use of Services: Do They Have Any Clinical Significance, 3 HEALTH AFF. 63 (1984) (reviewing
the literature and concluding that "no one can really say" whether geographic
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Alain Enthoven, one of the leading managed care advocates,
believes that the situation is so complex and fluid that government may be unable to specify new "rules" of socially desirable
competition. In his view, a new kind of organization representing collective consumer interests (regional alliances, purchasing cooperatives, and large employers in a reconceived role)
will have to engage in complex, ongoing negotiations with
health care plans and providers about these issues, thereby
"managing" the dynamics of health care market competition.4 9
At best, the Act invites Americans to participate in a very
complex ongoing discussion about the nature of reform. This
discussion addresses what kinds and patterns of health care
(and for whom) "we" want to pay for out of collective
funds-through subsidies and tax exemptions-and what kinds
will be considered individual consumption preferences to be
paid for with individual, after-tax dollars, and thereby probably unavailable to the majority of the population. This "discussion" will take place in many forums, including National
Health Board decisions about the necessity and appropriateness of care; decisions by state governments establishing alliances or single-payer systems; decisions by alliances about
health plan performance, risk-adjusted premiums, and innovative services; health plan decisions about utilization management, practice guidelines, reimbursement, staffing, and a host
of other issues; and consumer decisions about where to enroll,
what to ask for, and whether to complain if expectations are
thwarted. The fulfillment of the principles of equality, quality,
and entitlement set forth in Part I of this Article depends upon
how this discussion is structured and, indeed, whether it takes
place in any meaningful form.

variations mean that high-use or low-use rates, or both, are appropriate, and outlining research agenda); Mark R. Chassin et al., Does Inappropriate Use Explain
Geographic Variations in the Use of Health Care Services?, 258 JAMA 2533 (1987)
(study largely cannot confirm hypothesis that higher use is correlated with higher
inappropriate use); Kathleen N. Lohr & Marilyn J. Field, A ProvisionalInstrument
for Assessing Clinical Practice Guidelines, in IOM/GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at
346; Stone, supra note 9, at 113-14. The Institute of Medicine ("IOM") studies
make clear that the IOM's perspective is to build on the strengths of clinical practice guidelines and utilization management, rather than engage in wholesale critique. IOMfUTILIZATION, supra note 10, at 4.
" See Enthoven, supra note 9, at 28-31.
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The Health Security Act and the Problem of Entitlement

By this point it should be clear that statutory language
and establishment of formal regulatory structures alone will
not guarantee the Act's promise of universal entitlement to a
comprehensive health benefit package, particularly for consumers with average or below-average incomes. Bringing this entitlement into being will require information, advocacy, public
awareness, and resources. How does the HSA measure up
against these realities?
The Act relies on three mechanisms to define and protect
entitlements. First, it establishes a system for bringing claims
almost exclusively through a new administrative process. Second, it acknowledges the existence of pre-existing health benefits law (largely state law) that is judicially enforceable, and
creates new federal litigation rights and resources. Third, it
creates new regulatory structures at the federal, state, and
regional (within a state) levels. To some extent, these
intiatives represent an advance over the current fragmented,
highly inadequate non-system of rights and remedies. Yet, the
new mechanisms nevertheless contain major omissions and
limitations. Although the flaws in all three mechanisms are
serious, this Article focuses on the administrative claims pro50
cess.o
Under the HSA, an individual patient must file a "claim"
with a health plan for "payment" or "provision" (including pre-

" For analysis of all three statutory systems, see Rand E. Rosenblatt, On
Access to Justice, Discrimination, and Health Care Reform (Jan. 31, 1994) (testimony before the Subcomm. on Health & Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce) (revised text for the record Feb. 14, 1994) (on file with the Brooklyn
Law Review). The major defects of the judicial enforcement system are: (1) its
failure to repeal or modify the ERISA preemption of state tort and contract law,
thereby arguably leaving consumers covered by self-funded employer plans, and
certainly consumers within corporate alliances, without adequate judicial remedies
for negligent utilization management, and (2) its failure to specify comprehensive,
uniform, and sufficiently effective standards of antidiscrimination law. For example,
the judicial enforcement system fails to specify sexual orientation as a prohibited
ground of discrimination. The major defects of the regulatory system are: (1) its
failure to require collection of data on the race and ethnicity of patients served;
(2) its failure to secure independent governance and funding of the ombudsman
office; (3) its failure to provide for independent and organized consumer advocacy
at various points in the system; and (4) its failure to require more explicitly states
and alliances to serve traditionally disfavored interests.
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authorization) of services.5 1 Upon receiving the claim "in complete form" the health plan must notify the patient within 30
days of its disposition. This notification must include specific
reasons for a denial and, if applicable, a description of necessity/appropriateness guidelines and of the process used in making the determination, together with notice of the right to
appeal for reconsideration by the plan." "Urgent Requests to
Plans for Preauthorization" must be acted upon within 24
hours, or else the plan is deemed to have approved the
claim. 3
In the event a plan denies a claim, the claimant-consumer
or "any person aggrieved... by a denial of payment or provision of benefits under the plan" may file a complaint, under
oath or affirmation, with the complaint review office for the
appropriate regional alliance within one year.5 4 The complaint
review office will then notify the complainant of three options:
(1) to forego further administrative proceedings and rely on
any available judicial remedies; (2) to submit the complaint to
an alternative dispute resolution program; or (3) to proceed
with an adminstrative hearing.55 If the third option is chosen
or is pursued after failure of alternative dispute resolution, a
de novo hearing is held before a state hearing officer in the
complaint review office established by the state for each regional alliance.56 Regional alliances are also required to establish "an office of an ombudsman to assist consumers in dealing
with problems that arise with health plans and the alli57
ance."
Further appeal may be had to a five-person Federal
Health Plan Review Board ("FHPRB") under appellate stan-

51 HSA
52

Id.

§ 5201(a)(1).

§ 5201(b)(1), (e). Amazingly, the HSA does not appear to require plans to

notify consumers of their clear statutory right to appeal beyond the plan itself.
Section 5201(b)(1) states that the plan must notify the denied claimant of "the
right to appeal the denial under paragraph (2)." Id. Paragraph (2) in turn deals
with the plan's own review or reconsideration of its denial. See id. § 5201(b)(2).
3 Id. § 5201(c).
5' Id. § 5202(a), (b), (e), (g).
5' Id. § 5203(a).
16 HSA §§ 5202(a)(1), 5204(a)(1). Qualifications, training and conflict-of-interest
issues with respect to hearing officers will be regulated by the federal Secretary of
Labor. Id. § 5204(a)(1)(B).
57 Id. § 1326.
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dards of review and, if the amount in controversy is over
$10,000, an additional appeal may be taken to a United States
Court of Appeals. 5 Claimants who prevail at the complaint
review office stage or higher are entitled to a reasonable
attorney's fee, expert witness fees, and other reasonable
costs. 59
These provisions represent an advance over the current
situation, in which claimants often are not informed of any
rights of appeal or reconsideration, the existence of administrative remedies varies from state to state, and compensation for
litigation costs and ombudsperson assistance is rarely available. At the same time, however, many improvements are
needed.6" The most important of these improvements relate to
the changing nature of health financing and delivery, and to
consumers' need for advocacy assistance to present their positions effectively.
If advocacy resources were available, the Act's claims system would function well to protect participants in traditional
insurance plans, where patients typically receive services from
independent physicians and then submit claims for reimbursement. The system will not be adequate, however, for the millions of patients who will enroll, and whom the HSA encourages to enroll, in Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs")
and other capitated managed care plans. In these settings,
patients typically do not submit "claims" for services already
received, and "pre-authorization requests" may apply to only a
limited number of services. Rather, patients' explicit or implicit
requests for services will occur primarily in discussions with
individual health care providers, whose response may be influenced by practice guidelines and financial incentives structured
by the plan.6 ' If providers do not inform patients that certain

5, Id. § 5205.
"
Id. §§ 5204(f)(2), 5205(g).
60 For example, the 30 days given to plans to decide a claim, and another 30
days for reconsideration, are too long for many conditions that may not qualify as
"urgent requests," see HSA § 5201(b), (c), and should be shortened. Denials of urgent requests should be appealable beyond the hearing officer level. See id. §
5204(e)(2). There should be time limits for decisions by hearing officers and the
Federal Health Plan Review Board ("FHPRB"). The independent judgment of the
hearing officers and FHPRB members should be explicitly protected by statute.
Many of these points are presented in Rosenblatt, supra note 50.
6 See, e.g., BRADFORD H. GRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE: THE
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service options are or might be helpful, patients likely will not
be able to submit a claim for those services. Utilization management guidelines or financial incentives may also lead to the
termination or reduction of a course of treatment, including
hospitalization, nursing home care, or home health services,
without the patient even knowing that a coverage decision-rather than a decision focusing on the patient's individual welfare-has been made.
Effective procedures for reviewing low-visibility decisions
to deny or reduce care are essential for patient well-being and
equity of treatment, particularly because the increasing efforts
by payors (including HMOs) to influence the care of individual
patients are diverse, changing, and the subject of vigorous
debate. As the 1989 Institute of Medicine ("IOM") study of
utilization management stated, "we find a series of working
hypotheses and partial solutions that are continually revised,
discarded, and even reinvented as changes occur in medical
technology, social values, economic conditions, and other circumstances." 2 Insurance contracts typically use terms such
as "medically necessary" and "experimental treatment" without
clear definition. Yet there is no authoritative national body to
clarify their meaning, and their proper application in individual cases is hotly disputed.6 3 Moreover, the IOM study found

CHANGING ACCCOUNTABILITY OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS 228-33 & passim (1991)
(reviewing a wide range of financial incentives and noting that "[wihat is
clear . . . is that the arrangements in some plans create some very strong
disincentives against physicians' making patient care decisions (regarding hospitalization, diagnostic services, specialist referrals) that would cost the plan money").
62 IOM/UTILIZATION, supra note 10, at 1. A study of California HMOs serving
Medicare patients surveyed hospital social workers and home health agency and
rehabilitation hospital staff-professionals who are often seeking HMO approval for
costly specialty services on behalf of patients-to determine who actually authorized coverage for care. A majority of the respondents reported that while treating
physicians may play some role in the process, the ultimate decision was made by
medical group utilization review departments or managers. MEDICARE RISK, supra
note 44, at 80.
Compare Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 809 F. Supp. 1333 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (finding high dosage chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow transplant
("HDC/ABMT'") a covered treatment for breast cancer), rev'd, 18 F.3d 1405 (7th
Cir. 1994) with Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1992)
(finding HDC/ABMT to be not covered as a treatment for skin cancer); see also
Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993) (insurance company approves ABMT for treatment of testicular cancer and patient undergoes first two
stages of treatment; company then withdraws approval for third stage of treat-
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that in 1989, "[slystematic evidence about the impact of utilization management methods on the quality of care and on patient and provider costs is virtually nonexistent."' Given the
wide variety of criteria, incentives, training, supervision, and
implementation methodologies, the IOM recommended that
utilization management criteria-including those used by hospitals and IMOs-be made available for outside scrutiny by
physicians, purchasers, and patients. The IOM study further
determined that a system for patients and physicians to appeal
utilization management decisions "is an essentialprotectionfor
65
patients."
Four changes in the HSA are critical if this protection is to
be achieved. First, there must be an extensive system of notice
and explanation to consumers about the existence of the appeals process and how it works, and about advocacy resources
to assist them. The notice provision in § 5201(b)(1), which
appears to require plans only to notify claimants of their right
to appeal within the plan, is totally inadequate. Consumers
should receive notice of the appeals system both upon enrollment and whenever the plan denies a request or payment for
services. "Notice" must include addresses and telephone numbers of the alliance complaint review office and of the ombudsman and other advocacy offices. In addition, plans should be
required to provide consumers with periodic notice of their
appeal rights, and prominently place notices describing appeal
rights and advocacy resources in provider offices and waiting
66
rooms.
Second, the term "claim" must be broadened to fit the

ment, then reverses itself again and approves third stage after notification of lawsuit by patient; wrongful death action based on effects of delay in treatment held
preempted by ERISA), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1612 (1994); $90-Million Lawsuit
Award Cuts to the Core of Managed Care Debate: Critics See the Case as an Example of Cost Obsession; A Cancer Patient Died After Her HMO Refused to Pay for
an Expensive Treatment, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1994, at D4 (summarizing Nelene Fox
v. Health Net, No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 1993), and quoting officials of
other HMOs to the effect that companies make exceptions to guidelines for "business reasons" not related to medical outcomes).
" IOM/UTILIZATION, supra note 10, at 4; see also MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE,
MONEY, AND MORALS 163 (1993).
'5 IOMEUTILIZATION, supra note 10, at 6 (emphasis supplied).
" See Geraldine Dallek, Will Patients and Doctors be Protected Under Health
Care Reform? 3 (Feb. 3, 1994) (testimony before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources) (on file with author).
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existing realities of health care delivery. Specifically, the decision of a plan to reduce or terminate an ongoing service, such
as hospitalization or home health care, should trigger notice
from the plan to the patient of the basis for the decision and of
the patient's right to seek review. More generally, following
current Medicare regulations regarding HMO grievances and
appeals, the Act should make clear that consumers have a
right to file a complaint and obtain a hearing whenever they
believe that services or coverage required by the comprehensive
benefit package have been wrongfully denied.6 7 The obscure
phrasing of § 5202(b)(1), allowing complaints only for denial of
benefits "under the plan," could lead to artfully drafted plans
that attempt to insulate themselves from administrative or
judicial review.
Third, patients, particularly elderly and low-income patients, must have access to free or low-cost advocacy assistance
if their cases are going to have any chance of being fairly
heard. Physicians traditionally have acted as advocates for
their patients in dealing with coverage and reimbursement issues. " But, as third-party utilization management and review
has become more widespread and aggressive, there has been a
"reportedly high level of physician compliance with the determinations of utilization managers."69 Disturbingly, at the
same time "almost one-third of the physicians who responded
to a 1988 American Medical Association ("AMA") survey said
that they had patients who had suffered an aggravation of an
illness or injury as a result of delays or denials in a prior-authorization process. " "
The Health Security Act recognizes that physicians' opin-

'7 See 42 C.F.R. § 417.606 (1992); see also Rosenblatt, supra note 50, at 8-9;
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF NEW YORK CITY, COMM. ON FED. LEGIS., PROCEDURAL
ISSUES IN THE 1994 HEALTH SECURITY ACT 3-4 (Apr. 1994) [hereinafter ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR REPORT].
" See, e.g., Sarchett v. Blue Shield of Cal., 729 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1987).
" GRAY, supra note 61, at 309. Gray quotes one medical journalist as reporting
that when utilization review companies determine that further hospital care is not
medically necessary, "[iun almost all cases, the attending physician will discharge
the patient." Id.; see also MEDICARE RISK, supra note 44, at 81, noting that according to some survey respondents, "there is little conflict over referrals between
primary care doctors and utilization review departments. This apparent harmony is
attributable to, as one respondent put it, 'physician's sensitivity to overutilization
and financial risk issues'." Id.
"0 GRAY, supra note 61, at 303.
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ions are vital evidence in the resolution of many disputes, and
requires plans to rely on qualified physicians to resolve medical issues raised by claims.' But how claimants will obtain
access to independent medical expertise to assist them in evaluating their own cases is unclear. Enrollees in managed care
plans ordinarily have coverage only to see physicians associated with the plan. "Current experience with Medicare HMOs is
that plan physicians will not offer evidence that contradicts
their plan [or] employer's decision to deny a service.' 2 While
some patients may be able to afford a second opinion from an
out-of-plan physician, and later hope to re-coup such costs
through a successful appeal, most low- and moderate-income
patients will not be able to afford such an up-front expense,
with only a contingent and delayed hope of later recovery.
Thus, many meritorious claims may be foreclosed.
The integrity of the claims process requires a source of
advocacy assistance for participants so that they can understand the process, present their claims appropriately and effectively, and have access to medical expertise where needed. The
most efficient way of providing such assistance is through a
system of qualified non-attorney patient advocates, backed by
legal and medical expertise. A logical location for these advocacy services is the office of the ombudsman, which the Act creates. According to § 1326(a), "[e]ach regional alliance must
establish and maintain an office of an ombudsman to assist
consumers in dealing with problems that arise with health
plans and the alliance.7 3 These offices could train and employ
patient advocates, organize and pay for appropriate medical
expertise, and assist the private bar (through continuing legal
education) in representing consumers. To perform these advocacy functions effectively, the ombudsman offices should be
substantially independent of the regional alliances, with their

See HSA § 5201(b)(4)(C).
Alfred J. Chiplin & Sally H. Wilson, Proposed Revisions to Health Care
Reform Act 1 (Nov. 4, 1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Brooklyn
Law Review).
HSA § 1326(a). The Act also permits states to exercise an option of permitting alliance consumers to designate voluntarily one dollar of the premium paid
for their enrollment in an alliance health plan to pay for the operation of the
office of the ombudsman. Id. § 1326(b). The Act does not further address the governance, funding, structure, authority, or functions of the ombudsman's office.
7
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own boards of directors chosen on the basis of appropriate
advocacy criteria and their own secure source of funding, ideally calculated as a percentage of alliance premiums.7 4 Similar
agencies already exist in the form of nursing home ombudsmen, protection and advocacy agencies for the developmentally
disabled and mentally ill, and legal services programs, public
defenders, and consumer or public advocates specializing in the
area of health care delivery.
The fourth change, and perhaps most difficult, involves the
substantive standards to be used in deciding claims and appeals. The Act currently contains no explicit standards.7"
Where a service is determined by a health plan to be "experimental," "investigatory," "not medically necessary or appropriate," or "inconsistent with the plan's practice guidelines," however, the Act does require plans to reveal the basis of such a
determination. The Act also requires plans to disclose the
"medical basis" of their determinations and "the process used
in making [them]. "76 But how should a hearing officer, and
those at higher levels of review, evaluate a plan's claim that its
"practice guidelines" justify withholding a certain service or
procedure in a particular case? Assuming the guideline was
sufficiently clear and internally coherent, a hearing officer,
with the assistance of expert testimony, could probably determine whether the practice guideline was accurately applied
according to its own frame of reference. But, given the lack of
national or professional consensus about what an adequate
practice guideline is, the validity of the guidelines themselves
will inevitably be challenged.
Indeed, as with many other important concepts in the
rapidly changing health care context, no consensus exists even
about the definition of the term "practice guideline." As the
IOM 1992 Guidelines Report ("Report") notes,
[s]ometimes the term practice guideline serves as an umbrella label
for practice standards, protocols, parameters, algorithms, and various other types of statements about appropriate clinical care; at
other times, sharp distinctions are drawn. Debate about terminology
reflects, in part, controversy and disagreement about the uses of

7 Accord Dallek, supra note 66; ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR REPORT, supra note
67. 75
See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying
text (discussing HSA § 5006).
7' HSA § 5201(e)(2), (3).
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guidelines and related materials.77

The Report defines the term "practice guidelines" as "systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical
circumstances."7" The Report draws a distinction between
practice guidelines and "medical review criteria," which are
"systematically developed statements that can be used to assess the appropriateness of specific health care decisions, services, and outcomes."79 This distinction appears to concern
function. Practice guidelines are to be used prospectively by
practitioners and patients to "assist" in decisions about "appropriate" care, although how and through what mechanisms
remains unclear. Medical review criteria, by contrast, are to be
used by persons or entities outside the physician-patient relationship to "assess" the appropriateness of care for both quality
assurance and cost containment purposes." The Report notes
that medical review criteria and related tools "should and do
build on guidelines and may in some cases be virtually identical."81 The Health Security Act refers only to "practice guidelines," and evidently contemplates their use in health plan
decisions denying claims for payment or provision of services.
Buried in the detached language of these definitions are
important, even explosive, questions of social policy. Is it possible to construct guidelines that are "valid," i.e., that "lead to
the health and cost outcomes projected for them?"82 The Report advocates that medical review criteria should identify a
role for patients in assessing the appropriateness of care or, at
least, take into account patient preferences. It also advocates
providing "explicit guidance about the considerations to be

IOMGUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 26.
IOMIGUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 27.
71 IOM/GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 27.
" In either context, the IOM report defines "appropriate" care as "care for
which the expected health benefit exceeds the expected negative consequences by a
sufficient margin that the care is worth providing." IOMIGUIDELINES, supra note
10, at 28. The IOM report also states that the use of practice guidelines to assist
practitioners in making decisions "should not preclude their use for other purposes
including quality assurance and payment policymaking." Id. at 27.
8" IOM/GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 27. There was disagreement on the IOM
Committee about whether this distinction made sense, or whether the same term
should be used in different contexts. See id. at 27 n.3.
82 IOMIGUIDELINEs, supra note 10, at 8.
"
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taken into account when adverse review decisions are appealed
by professionals or patients." 3 This is particularly important
because, as Dr. Robert H. Brook, a leading researcher on
guidelines, points out, varying economic perspectives can influence the definition of "appropriateness.""
None of this is to say that guidelines may not be useful in
different contexts and for different purposes. But guidelines
are currently being developed by a wide range of entities-for
example, professional societies, hospitals, HMOs, insurance
companies-for many different purposes, including payment
policy and utilization management, and there is little consensus on methodology or criteria for guideline evaluation. In
1990, an IOM study committee on clinical practice guidelines
found that "no explicit method was available for assessing
existing or emerging practice guidelines.... [that is,] nothing
existed to judge the quality, reliability, and validity of the
content of the guideline itself."5 To remedy this situation, in
1992, the IOM articulated eight "desirable attributes" of practice guidelines, and a separate list of eight such attributes for
medical review criteria, 6 and set forth a provisional instru-

IOMIGUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 9.
See Robert H. Brook, Practice Guidelines and PracticingMedicine: Are They
Compatible?, 262 JAMA 3027, 3029 (1988). Brook reports on a RAND Corporation
study of the appropriate use of three diagnostic and treatment procedures in the
Medicare population. After a literature review, nine-member multispecialty physician panels were assembled for each procedure. Using a modified Delphi process (a
process for arriving at group consensus out of individual judgment), each panel
ranked "indications" for the medical procedure on a scale of 1 (low appropriateness) to 9 (high appropriateness). The rankings were then applied to the case
records of over 4500 patients who had undergone the medical procedures. In 12%
of the cases there was "agreement" (as defined by the process) that the medical
procedure had been inappropriate, and in 36% of the cases there was agreement
that the care had been appropriate, with the remainder of the cases being subject
to various degrees of disagreement. Brook asks: "[Wihat did we find?", and notes
that the answer depends "on how and from what perspective one views the data."
A physician who believes in clinical freedom might argue that only the 12% of the
cases in which the panel agreed on inappropriateness should be so labeled (and
perhaps not covered by Medicare), while a budget-pressed Medicare official might
argue that the program should pay only for the 36% of the cases in which the
panel agreed on appropriateness. As Brook notes, "a lot of medicine exists between
these two extremes." Id.
Lohr & Field, supra note 48, at 346.
a' The desirable attributes for practice guidelines are: validity, reliability/reproducibility, clinical applicability, clinical flexibility, clarity, multidisciplinary
process, scheduled review, and documentation. IOMIGUIDELINES, supra note 10, at
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ment for assessing clinical practice guidelines. 7 These commendable initiatives, however, do not provide hearing officers
or other non-medical decisionmakers-or even most physicians-with usable standards of evaluation. As Lohr and Field
point out, the provisional instrument form "is not simple," and
"the IOM does not expect practicing physicians or other clinicians, patients, other nonprofessionals, or policymakers to
apply this instrument."8
The Report also raises important questions about whether
and how patients should be informed about clinical practice
guidelines, both as a matter of fair decisionmaking about
which plan to join, and informed consent to particular treatments. The Report states:
[Bly enrolling in certain types of health plans, should patients forfeit

their right to information-at the point of service-about treatment
options of some benefit that are not (or may not be) covered by the
plan? If so, is such a forfeiture absolute, or is it conditional on the
provision to patients of clear advance warning that such limits may
be applied? If the latter, who is responsible for that advance warning-government, an employer, the health plan, or the practitioner?
How detailed should the warning be with respect to how limits are
set and which specific treatment options are not available (taking
legal, organizational, and other practical issues into account)?
Should the warning meet certain readability standards (e.g., eighthgrade reading level)? 9

These questions, raised by a prestigious national committee,
suggest that the widespread development and use of practice
guidelines and protocols has proceeded without sufficient consideration, let alone resolution, of fundamentally important
questions. The Act's few references to these issues are exceedingly brief. Health plans are required to "disclose to enrollees
(and prospective enrollees) the protocols used by the plan for

8. The desirable attributes for medical review criteria are: sensitivity, specificity,

patient responsiveness, readability, minimum obtrusiveness, feasibility, computer
compatibility, and appeals criteria. Id. at 9.
87 See Lohr & Field, supra note 48, at 346.
88 Lohr & Field, supra note 48, at 347. The provisional instrument is designed
to be used by individuals or groups with three types of expertise: clinical experience treating conditions covered by the guideline, research experience in the conditions or technologies covered, and methodological skills in developing guidelines.

See id.
89 IOMJGUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 150-51.
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controlling utilization and costs,"" and "procedures for assuring and improving the quality of care."91 Regional alliances
must make available, in "an easily understood" form, information that allows individuals to make valid comparisons among
health plans concerning costs, characteristics, and availability
of providers, and "any restrictions on access to providers and
services under the plan."9 2 As previously discussed, health
plans must disclose clinical practice guidelines when used as a
basis for denial of claims.93 While, in theory, these simple,
skeletal provisions could generate substantial pro-consumer
information and review, the track record of federal and state
agencies on collecting, disseminating, and using even more
elementary information about HMO utilization and grievances
is not encouraging.9"
Eventually, some usable standards may come into e2dstence through federal guidelines. The HSA does direct the National Quality Management Council ("NQMC") and the Administrator for Health Care Policy and Research ("AHCPR") "to
develop and periodically review and update clinical practice
guidelines that may be used by health care providers in determining how diseases, disorders and other health conditions can
most effectively and appropriately be prevented, diagnosed,
90 HSA § 1412.
9'Id. § 1404(b)(1)(D).
92 Id. § 1325.
'" Id. § 5201(e)(3).
94 See MEDICARE RISK, supra note 44, at 105, 113-20 (although many HMOs
have extensive data on utilization, they do not release this data to the public;
data reported to government agencies, such as the federal Health Care Financing
Administration ("HCFA7) and the California Department of Corporations ("DOC"),
are virtually useless for evaluating HMO performance because of lack of consistent
definition of "hospitalization" among HMOs and lack of age-and sex-adjusted data);
id. at 95-97 (HCFA's Beneficiary Inquiry Tracking System ("BITS"), while of some
use, must be read with caution because HCFA does not systematically collect inquiries/complaint data, beneficiaries are not informed that they can submit complaints to HCFA, and there is no information about the seriousness or validity of
the inquiries/complaints); id. at 99-100 (DOC purports to rely primarily on consumer complaints to monitor HMOs, but does not inform Medicare HMO beneficiaries
that they can submit complaints to DOC, has no formal record of complaints, and
could not supply researchers with any information about number of complaints
regarding each HMO or breakdown of the type of complaint); id. at 103-04, 133
(no federal or state agency supplies the public with any information on HMO complaint records; it took the Medicare Advocacy Project "almost a year and substantial effort, including litigation, to obtain what is, by law, public information" from
HCFA).
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treated, and managed clinically."9 5 Such guidelines must incorporate or be consistent with six factors or standards. For
example, guidelines must "be based on the best available research and professional judgment regarding the effectiveness96
and appropriateness of health care services and procedures."
Moreover, the NQMC is directed to "establish standards and
procedures for evaluating the clinical appropriateness of protocols used to manage health service utilization."97 Finally, the
NQMC is required to direct the AHCPR to "develop and publish standards relating to methodologies" for development of
clinical practice guidelines, and to "establish a procedure by
which individuals and entities may submit [clinical practice
guidelines to the NQMC] for evaluation and certification" using
the developed standards.9
While these and other provisions may help shape, and be
shaped by, an eventual professional or national consensus on
practice guidelines, they will not provide usable standards of
decision for the administrative claims process within the short
or perhaps even medium term. As the IOM reports make clear,
such consensus and standards do not now exist, and are likely
to take a considerable time to develop. Furthermore, the Act
itself does not appear to require the use of these standards in
the administrative process. While the HSA is careful to state
that clinical practice guidelines developed or certified by the
NQMC "may" be used by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") in the medical malpractice liability pilot
program, 9 the Act does not require hearing officers to use
such guidelines or standards as the basis of decision, nor does
it appear to require health plans to use them in setting their
own practice guidelines or utilization protocols.'

HSA § 5006(a)(1). See generally id. §§ 5002-5007.
"

Id.

§ 5006(a)(2)(A).

Id. § 5006(a)(3).
Id. § 5006(b)(1), (2)
s' See id. § 5006(a)(4), (b)(3), referring to § 5312, which requires the Secretary
of HHS, if NQMC guidelines are available, to establish and fund a pilot program
in one or more states to determine the effect of allowing provider compliance with
such guidelines to be "a complete defense" in a medical malpractice liability action.
1" The requirement in § 5006(a)(1) that the NQMC and the AHCPR review and
update "guidelines that may be used by health care providers" (emphasis added),
could be interpreted as a prohibition on the use of any guidelines not so "reviewed." This interpretation is not consistent with other sections of the Act (e.g., §
'7
"
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Against this background of transition and uncertainty, two
issues may prove to be of critical importance: (1) the allocation
of the burden of proof in the administrative process; and (2)
incorporation of patient interests and perspectives into the
guidelines themselves. Regarding the burden of proof, the Act
states that hearing officers make decisions based "upon the
preponderance of the evidence," but does not state who has the
burden of proof or persuasion. 10 ' If the claimant has the burden of proving that a clinical practice guideline is "invalid,"
doing so may well be impossible because of the absence of
professional consensus concerning standards for guideline
validity, and the possibly large costs involved in trying to present such proof. In contrast, placing the burden on the plan to
prove the guideline "valid" or at least "not invalid" is defensible
on several grounds. First, the health plan has far greater resources to conduct research and mobilize medical expertise.
Second, the plan will, of course, be knowledgeable about its
own process of guideline development. Third, placing the burden on the plan would have the beneficial effect of providing
plans with an incentive to be careful to use the best available
methods in their development of guidelines.
Regarding patient interests, the IOM 1992 Guidelines
Report recommends several "desirable attributes" of medical
review criteria. 2 Addressing patient responsiveness, the Report stated "review criteria should specifically identify a role
for patient preferences or ensure that the process for using
them allows for some consideration of patient preferences." The
Report also called for readability, noting that "review criteria
should be presented in language and formats that can be read
and understood by nonphysician reviewers, practitioners, and
patient/consumers."" 3 Focusing on appeals criteria, the Report recommended that "criteria should provide explicit guidance about the considerations to be taken into account when
adverse decisions are appealed by professionals or pa-

5201(e)(3), which requires disclosure of a plan's practice guidelines if used as the
basis of a claim denial, but which makes no reference to certification or other
regulatory process), nor is it likely that such a major policy judgment would be
left to obscure inference from a single word.
101HSA § 5204(d)(1).
10 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
103 IOM/GuIDELINES, supra note 10, at 9.
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tients."0 4 Finally, the Report called for development of "general guidelines on patient information and informed consent"
through "a more inclusive development process involving...
more representation of health care purchasers and third-party
payers, consumers and patients, and the legal profession.""5
As currently written, the Health Security Act does not explicitly address any of these issues. The NQMC, perhaps in conjunction with the National Health Board, should be required to
develop policies within a set period (e.g., two years) on these
matters, which would be binding on the administrative review
and plan certification process, or report to Congress on why
such a mandate could not be achieved and what legislative
changes should be enacted as a consequence.
D. The Paradoxof Entitlement and Inequality
Up to this point, this Article has discussed barriers to
achieving entitlements that affect the great majority of Americans who likely will receive some version of managed care.
The struggle for effective consumer information, rights to
claims and appeals, advocacy assistance, and substantive standards of decision benefits a wide range of consumers from all
income groups and social classes and, hence, could be the basis
of the kind of "cross-class coalition" for which Ed Sparer
worked and advocated. In theory, low-income and minority
consumers would benefit especially from these developments,
because they are most at risk of lack of access, underservice,
and oppressive rationing of care. 6
Unfortunately, there is reason to believe that lower-income
and minority Americans often benefit disproportionately less
from entitlements, rights, and appeal procedures than other
citizens with more political, economic, and social resources and
support. A well-known example is that of special education for
handicapped children. A federal statute establishes extensive
rights of parental notice, hearing, and consent, 10 7 but, accordi IOMIGUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 9.
1O IOMGUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 152; see also id. at 204, 217-19.
e See, e.g., supra note 38; Rand E. Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health
Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1407-20 (1981); Andreas
Schneider & JoAnne Stern, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Poor: Problems and Prospects, 70 NV. U. L. REV. 90 (1975); Watson, supra note 37.
0 See Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60: 105

ing to Professor Joel Handler,
[tihere seems little doubt.., that the procedures designed to give
the parents a participatory role in decisions affecting their children
do not work....
The average parent, especially in lower socio-economic classes, does
not have the ability to participate. In addition to the psychological
burdens of coping with a handicapped child, most parents lack the
information and the resources to deal with the school bureaucracy.... While the articulate, knowledgeable, middle and upper-middle class parents, pressing for expensive out-of-school placements for
severely handicapped children, hold their own, the average lower
class or minority parents are silenced by administrative domination ....108

Handler generalizes this point as follows:
[In the 1960s and mid-1970s, there was a vast outpouring of substantive entitlements and due process remedies. Yet, for the most
part, the reforms [did] not work because most dependent people are
unable to take advantage of their rights. Our legal system is not
proactive. In order for the system to work there must be a complaining client. People have to know they have suffered a harm, they
have to blame someone rather than themselves for that harm, they
have to know how to pursue the remedy, they have to have resources to pursue the remedy, and the potential benefits of winning have
to outweigh the potential costs. All of these conditions are essential; .... All of the[se] conditions present formidable barriers to dependent people who deal with large-scale public bureaucracies." 9

These barriers to effective entitlement are particularly
powerful in the context of health care delivery. Ill patients
from all socioeconomic classes are "dependent" people, suddenly separated from "normal" humanity and enmeshed in complex dependency with their caregivers. Medical authority is
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
108 Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, The State, and the Modern/Postmodern
Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1009-10 (1988); see also
Howard Lesnick, The Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective on
Perspectives, 1991 DUKE L.J. 413, 419-39 & passim (exploring the law's response to
inequality in common law and theoretical contexts).
"09Id. at 1019-20. Handler does not explicitly define the term "dependent people." His examples refer to welfare recipients, most patients, most handicapped
children and their parents, and the frail, elderly poor. He appears to equate "dependency" with relationships that are, "at least initially, characterized by great
disparities in power, . . .strongly hierarchical, and, for all practical purposes, coercive." Id. at 1001.
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large and mysterious; insurance policies are complex and unknowable; and there is relatively little tradition or knowledge
of "consumerism" or advocacy on behalf of patients."0 The
expanded rights and procedures advocated in this Article, in
theory, would be available to all patients. In practice, however,
they might result in more inequality, as well-off, articulate
patients successfully challenge practice guidelines while the
great majority of patients are found to have "less persuasive"
claims or do not attempt to pursue them.
What is the significance of pervasive social inequality for
the desirability and meaning of rights? Some legal academics
view the high transaction costs and uneven benefit distribution
of contested rights as reasons to abolish rights as much as
possible and to rely on market mechanisms and charitable and
professional norms to provide services to the poor."' The
United States Supreme Court considered a similar issue in
Griffin v. Illinois, in the context of criminal appeals."' The
state conceded that two defendants convicted of armed robbery
needed a trial transcript in order to get adequate appellate
review, could not afford to pay for one, and had filed a timely
motion requesting that a transcript be provided without
charge. Because the state appellate courts had exercised no
substantive review, the Supreme Court assumed for purposes
of decision "that errors were committed in the trial that would
merit reversal," and that defendants would not receive a reversal solely because they could not afford a transcript."'
Even given these assumptions, Justice Harlan and three
other dissenting justices found no constitutional violation in

1..

See, e.g., Ann Hood, I'm Insured-I Think, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1994, at A21

(op-ed article by novelist recounting how she was denied maternity coverage without notice in March 1993 on the ground that she had moved from New York to
Rhode Island, and how she spent one year without success seeking a remedy from
the insurance company, the membership organization who sponsored the policy,
and the Rhode Island Department of Insurance, all apparently without consulting
a lawyer; coverage was eventually restored with "no apology, no explanation").
. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 10; Epstein, supra note 25. Other analysts
want to restrict opportunities for litigation in favor of bureaucratic rationality,
relying primarily on management norms and incentives and "adequate and expeditious administrative remedies" to achieve fairness and maximum social utility. See,
e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, Praise Reform and Start the Litigation?, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1735 (1993).
12 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
1

Id.

at 16.
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the state's refusal to provide a transcript. In the dissenter's
view, economic inequality pervasively affected the realization
of rights. This disparity determined (in that pre-Gideon era)
whether counsel could be obtained at all, the quality of counsel, and the thoroughness of investigation. The state had no
duty to moderate the inequalities flowing from these circumstances. It could charge tuition for state university, even
though that might bar a poor but qualified student. This inability to realize a right-to appeal a criminal conviction-was
no different in principle from any of these other market-created barriers."'
In reply, Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion conceded
that "[a] man of means may be able to afford the retention of
an expensive, able counsel not within reach of a poor man's
purse," and that the state had no duty to correct these "contingencies of life."" 5 But that did not justify a state denying
poor-and by hypothesis, erroneously convicted-defendants
the practical opportunity to any appellate review, as long as it
provided the general opportunity for such review. "The State,"
wrote Frankfurter, "is not free to produce such a squalid discrimination ....
[It] cannot keep the word of promise to the ear
of those illegally convicted and break it to their hope." 6
Whatever the merits of Justice Frankfurter's particular drawing of lines, the challenge for persons committed to equality
and quality in health care is to devise egalitarian ways of securing rights in a pervasively unequal world.
History and scholarship suggest two potential solutions to
this challenge, although each solution is itself hard to achieve.
The first, eloquently advocated by Ed Sparer and many others
in the labor, civil rights, antipoverty, and feminist movements,
involves the existence of "social movements." As individuals,
people are often overwhelmed by economic, physical, and emotional needs, and disempowered through fear and self-blame.
"The successful appropriation of rights depends on empowerment," which can occur "through group identification and soli-

114

See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Burton & Minton, JJ., dissent-

ing); id. at 29 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 358 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting); id. at 360 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
m Griffin, 351 U.S. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
m Id. at 24.
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darity.""7 To mention only one of many examples, advocates
for pay equity for women used federal statutory rights as tools
in a broad-based movement that drew its energy from many
other cultural sources as well. "[Tihrough organization,
people's feelings about themselves changed. Women were now
fighting for the recognition of their own worth."" 8 One of the
great unknowns is whether there are social groupings and
organizations in the United States with sufficient vision and
resources to bring a broad-based health consumers movement
into existence, with connections to other social movements
such as those for equality based on race, gender, ethnicity,
sexual orientation, disability, and economic class. Efforts along
these lines are taking place,"' and only after years of sustained work will we know their potential for influence and
success.
A second direction for effort, which might complement
social movements, involves strengthening and expanding an
ethic of dialogue and empowerment between health care providers and consumers. Joel Handler, William Simon and others
have identified situations in which rights have had a "regenerative" character because the relevant professionals treated the
autonomy of the client as a goal to be actively and supportively
achieved rather than as a formal and unrealistic premise or
assumption.' The IOM reports reflect this ethic by calling
for new ways of incorporating patient preferences and rights
into the development and implementation of practice guidelines. But whether this kind of professional ethic can flourish
against the large forces of traditional hierarchical professionalism, on the one hand, and de-professionalization characteristic
of market competition (e.g., doctors being increasingly treated
as skilled employees under the control of higher management),

117 Handler, supra note 6, at 971.
"' Handler, supra note 6, at 964

(citing Michael McCann, Legal Mobilization,
Rights Consciousness, and the Politics of Pay Equity Reform (June 8-11, 1989)
(paper delivered at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association).
.. See, e.g., Mydans, supra note 5.
12 See, e.g., Handler, supra note 6, at 1096 & passim; Handler, supra note 108;
William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1431 (1986); William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare
Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1 (1985); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567 (1993) (analyzing growing literature and exploring philosophical context).
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on the other, is a sobering question, and one that suggests the
degree of conscious effort that will be required to achieve the
ethic's development.
CONCLUSION

I remember reading that Justice Holmes once said, presumably in one of his more cynical or despairing moments,
something to the effect that his work as a judge was not doing
justice, but "just following the rules." For poor Americans and,
I have argued, for most Americans, "following the rules" under
health care reform is not opposed to justice. It is justice, if
"following the rules" is understood as a process of fair notice,
fair application, and fair dialogue over discretion and evolving
standards. Achieving entitlement to equality and quality of
care depends on building such fairness into our legal structures and creating a culture that understands and supports
them.

